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HALLETT V. SLAUGHTER

[L. A. No. 18369.

[22 C.2d

In Bank. July 23, 1943.]

GLADYS MEYER HALLETT, Respondent, v. J.
SLAUGHTER et al., Appellants.

A.

[1] Judgments - Equitable Relief-Evidence-Suffi.ciency-Mailing of Answer.-In an action to vacate a default judgment
rendered against plaintiff as a defendant in another action,
the evidence supported a finding that her answer and a copy
thereof were mailed on the day following that on which she
was served with a copy of the summons and complaint in the
other action, where the attorney employed by plaintiff to defend her in such action testi:6.ed that he handed these papers,
together with the :6.ling fee, to his secretary, and instructed
the latter to mail the original answer and the fee to the clerk
of the court and to mail the copy to opposing counsel, and
where the secretary testi:6.ed that she did not recall the matter, but that if the papers had been given her to mail, then
she had mailed t h e m . '
.

'l

[2] Appeal ..,... Right of Review -- Compliance With Judgment:
Judgments - Opening and Vacating-Effect of -Subsequent
Proceedings.-The enforced satisfaction of a judgment does
not deprive the judgment debtor of the right to appeal or to
seek to have the judgment vacated or set aside. A stipulation,
made by such debtor for the purpose of securing the release
of her salary held under levy ·of execution, and her affidavit
claiming exemption of her salary held under a subsequent levy,
did not defeat' her right to maintain an action to vacate the
judgment, where both the stipulation and the claim of exemption were involuntary steps forced upon her.

[3a, 3b] Judgments - Equitable Relief-Proceedings-Laches.In an action to vacate a default judgment rendered against
plaintiff as a defendant in another action, plaintiff was not
guilty of neglect, laches and want of diligence precluding relief, although some degree of negligence might be charged to
her attorney in not sooner discovering that her answer had not
been :6.led in the other action, where her delay in discovering
the entry of default was due in part to defendants' failure to
[2] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 227; 14 Cal.Jur. 1018.
[3] See 10 Ca1.Jur. 530; 15 Ca1.Jur. 35; 19 Am.Jur. 352; 31 Am.
Jur.278.
•
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 275; [2] Appeal and
Error, § 104; Judgments, § 154; [3] Judgments, § 265;[4] Judgments, § 253 j [5] Judgments, § 233.
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take. earlier action to enforce their judgment, where the present suit was commenced within a few weeks after plaintiff
learned of the mistake and has been diligently prosecuted by
her, and where defendants have not shown that they .have suffered injury as a result of the delay before plaintiff knew of
the mistake.
[4] Id. - Equitable Relief - Grounds-Accident and Mista.ke.EqUity will relieve an injure'd party from the effect of It default judgment, where complainant was prevented by extrinsic
accident and mistake of fact from presenting her defimse in
the action in which such judgment was rendered, and where
she was not guilty of negligence or laches. _ "
..

[5lId. - Equitable Relief - Limitations on Righ~DefenBeon
Merits.-While equity will not ordinarily interfere with Ii judg~
ment which is unjust unless it appears that' the . one whose
interests were infringed can present a meritorlQUS case, the
complainant need not allege a defense which can be. guaranteed
to prevail at a trial, but need only show with reasonablecertainty that a new trial would result in a judgment more favorable to her than that sought to be set aside.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Meyer B. Marion, Judge pro tem. Affirmed.
Action to vacate a default judgment. - Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
Herbert Gall and Edward Fitzpatrick for Appellants.
David I. Lippert for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants appeal from a·decree in equity
setting aside and vacating a judgnlent by default secured
against plaintiff in an action filed on April 17, 1940, in the
Muni~ipal Court of Los Angeles, and based on an assigned
claim for medical services allegedly furnished by Dr. Walter
B. Schwuchow (since deceased) to plaintiff and her son. In
that action defendants herein, Slaughter and Trigg, as operators of a collection agency named The Doctors Business
Bureau, were plaintiffs and plaintiff herein was a defendant.
In· the instant suit plaintiff herein was.also awarded a moriey
judgment against defendants for certain sums which defen[5] See 15 Cal.Jur. 29.
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dants had t:lollected from her by means of levies upon her
salary, under the municipal court judgment; enforcement of
the municipal court judgment was enjoinea; and the municipal court was ordered to permit plaintiff to .file her answer
in that court within ten days after judgment in the present
suit becomes final. Defendant Jennie 1. Schwuchow was
joined as the widow of Dr. Schwuchow and executrix of his
estate. We have conclud.ed that the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
It appears from the evidence and was found by the court
that on May 23, 1940, plaintiff was served with a copy of the
summons and complaint in the municipal court action; that
she forthwith employed an attorney to represent her in such
action, and her answer to the complaint therein, prepared by
her attorney and verified by her, and accompanied by the
requisite filing fee, was on May 24, 1940, deposited in the
United States mail at Los Angeles, California, enclosed in an
envelope with sufficient postage affixed, and directed to the
clerk of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles; that on the same
day a copy of the answer was mailed to the attorney for
plaintiffs in the municipal court action (defendants herein) ;
that neither the original nor the copy of the answer was
received by the respective addressees or returned to this plaintiff's attorney, but both were lost; that plaintiff imd her attorney believed the answer was on file. On June 4, 1940, the.
default of plaintiff herein WstS entered in the municipal court
action, and on December 27, 1940, judgment by default was
taken against her.
Early in January, 1941, execution was levied upon plaintiff's salary. This was the first knowledge leceived by either
plaintiff or her attorney that her answer had not reached the
clerk of the court and had not been filed, that her default had'
been entered, and that judgment had been taken against her.
Plaintiff sought release of her salary by filing a claim of
exemption under the provisions of section 690.11 of the COIle
of Civil Procedure, but before the claim was heard by the
court plaintiff stipulated with the judgment creditors that
they take half of the money under levy and that she receive
the other half. Early in February, 1941, defendants levied
upon plaintiff's salary a second time, and plaintiff stipulated
that they take $50 of the amount held. On February 24, 1941,
plaintiff filed this suit. A third salary levy was made in
March, 1941 j plaintiff again filed a claim of exemption j and
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after a hearing the court ordered that plaintiff was entitled
to half. the money and that defendants take the other half.
The trial court further found that plaintiff has a meritori~
ous defense to the municipal court action but that, by the
accidental loss, of her answer and the mistaken belief on her
part and on the part of her attorney that the answer was on
file, she was prevented from setting up such defense; that the
loss of the answer and the mistaken belief that it was on file
were "not due to any fault or neglect" of plaintiff or of her
attorney; that they "had the right to rely on the United States
Post Office" to transmit the answer as directed; that plaintiff
was diligent in bringing the present suit and was not guilty
of laches; and that plaintiffs, in the municipal court action
(defendants herein) willfully and with the intent to lull this
plaintiff into a false sense of security, refrained from pro.:
ceeding in that action until plaintiff's rights under section
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure were barred by lapse of
time, although "they knew that plaintiff's . . . salary payments were vulnerable to such proceedings."
Defendants' contentions are four:
1. That the evidence fails to support th~ finding that plaintiff's answer and the copy thereof were mailed (as set forth
above).
2. That by her stipulation made for the purpose of securing.
the release of her salary held under levy of execution, and by
her affidavit of exemption made following the March salary
levy and after the present suit was filed, plaintiff ratified and
confirmed the municipal court judgment and is now estopped
to attack it.
.
3. That plaintiff is guilty of neglect, of laches, and of want
of diligence, and therefore is not entitled to equitable relief.
4. That plaintiff failed to show that she has a meritorious
defense and that a new trial would result in a judgment more
favorable to h e r . '
[1] As to defendants' first, contention, the attorney employed by this plaintiff to defend her in the municipal court
aetion testified that on May 24, 1940, he handed plaintiff's
answer and a copy thereof, together with the filing fee, to his
secretary,and instructed her to mail the original answer and
the filing fee to the clerk of the municipal court and to mail
the copy to opposing counsel. The secretary testified that she
did not recall the matter, but that if the papers had been
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given her to mail, then she had mailed them, and that she
knew "there was sufficient postage because we had a scale.
r couldn't go wrong in that." This testimony supports the
finding that the papers were mailed..
[2] Defendants' second contention is answered by the
rule, well settled in California, that the enforced satisfaction
of a judgment does not deprive the judgment debtor of the
right to appeal or to seek to have the judgment vacated or set
aside. (See 14 Cal.Jur. 1018, sec. 84, and cases there cited;
Engelken v. Justice Oourt (1920),50 Cal.App. 157, 159 [195
P. 265]; and Hartke v. Abbott (1930), 106 Cal.App. 388,
391-393 [289 P. 206].) Plaintiff's stipulations went no furthel:
than to specify the amount which was to be paid each of the
respective parties to the judgment from the money held under
levy, and contain no suggestion of a compromise agreement,
of an affirmance of the judgment; or of a waiver of the right
to attack it. They were made for the sole purpose of securing
a prompt release to plaintiff of a portion of the money, and
cannot now be held to defeat her right to maintain this suit.
The same is true of plaintiff's affidavit claiming exemption
of her salary held under the levy made in March j the claim
of exemption and the subsequent court hearing thereon were
involuntary steps forced upon plaintiff in the same manner
as were the stipulations.
[3a] Defendants' third point-that because of neglect,
laches, and want of diligence plaintiff may not seek relief from
equity-is met by the findings of the trial court to the contrary on each of these issues. Although some degree of negli~
gence may be charged to the' .attorney employed by this
plaintiff to defend her in the municipal court action in not
sooner discovering that plaintiff's answer had not been filed,
we are uot prepared to say that his remissness in this regard
amounts to such inexcusable neglect as a matter of law that
plaintiff should be foreclosed of her right to maintain this
suit. Moreover, plaintiff's delay in discovering the entry of
her default was due i~ part at least to the apparently designed
and deliberate failurc of defenaauts to take earlier action to
secure and enforce their judgment. Weare in accord with
the following vicws set forth in Soule v. Bacon (1907), 150
Cal. 495, 497-498 [89 P. 324] : "There are many cases holding
that the party may have relief in equity from the consequences of his mistake of fact, although he was somewhat
negligent in making the mistake, if his negligence in no way
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prejudiced the opposIng party. [Citations.] .. At most, it
was a question of fact for the court below to determine
whether or not the lack of vigilance on the part of the plaintiff was such as would not have occurrcd with a man of ordinary
care and prudence, under the same circumstances. That court
has decided the question in favor of the plaintiff, and we are
sati<;fied with its conclusion."
[4] Plaintiff was prevented by extrinsic accident and mistake of fact from presenting her defense in the municipal
court action. That such accident and mistake furnish a
ground for equitable intervention under the circumstances of
this case is clear. (See Bidleman v. Kcwen (1852), 2 Cal. 248,
250 j Bibendv. Kreutz (1862), 20 Cal. 109, 110, 114 j Brackett
v. Banegas (1897),116 Cal. 278, 284 [48 P. 90,'58 Am:St.Rep.
164] j Bacon v. Bacon (1907), 150 Cal. 477,481, 486, 491 [89
P. 317] j Wattson v. Dillon (1936), 6 Cal.2d 33, 40 [56 P.2d
220] j Olivera v. Grace (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 570, 578 [122 P~2d
564, 140 A.L.R. 1328]; Boyle v. Boyle (1929), 97 Cal.App.
703,706 [276 P. 118] j Jeffords v. Young (1929),98 Cal.App.
400, 404 [277 P. 163] j Winn v. Torr (1938), 27 Cal.App.3d
623,627 [81 P.2d 457] j Wil.son v. Wilson (1942), 55 Cal.App.
2d 421, 426 [130P.2d 782].) .
.
,
[3b] This suit was commenced within a few weeks a~ter,
plaintiff learned of the mistake and has been dilig~ntly prosecuted by her. In addition, defendants have not shown that
thev have suffered injury as a result of the delay before plaintiff· knew of the mistake (a delay wb;ich, as llj.entionedabove,
was caused in part by defendants' own conduct), and therefore one element of laches ·is missing. (See 10 Cal.Jur. 530,
sec. 68, and cases there cited.)
'.
,
[5] The fourth contention .of defendants-that plaintiff
fniled· to show a meritorious defense-is also without foundation. Among the facts alleged by plaintiff by way of defense
to the municipal court action are: that a major portion of the
account there sucd upon was for services to her son, Eugene,
at a time when he was a minor, rather than to herself, and
that for I'mch services her obligation to the doctor, if any, was
as guardian of the estate of her son, rather than individually j
that the charges for such services "had been barred by the
statnte of limitations"; that the doctor had released and dis~
charged her from all liability prior to commencement of the
municipal court action j that her obligation to the doctor, if
any, had been discharged in tankruptcy; and that neither she
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nor her son had been acquainted with the doctor or under his
care during certain months covered by the account. Proof of
even a portion of these allegation:3 would result in a judgment
in the municipal court action which would be more favorable
to this plaintiff than that which was entered by default. As
stated in Olivera v. Grace (1942), supra, 19 Cal.2d 570,579,
"The requirement that the complaint allege a meritorious
ca.c:;e does not require an absolute guarantee of 7ictory." The
same observation may be made concerning the proof produced
by plaintiff in support of her allegations; she need .only show
with reasonable certainty that she would emerge ill a more
favorable position. (See 15 Cal.Jur. 29, sec. 128, and cas.es
there cited.) The trial court heard the testimony of plaintIff
and concluded that she has a meritorious defense to the
municipal court action and that "if the judgment therein is
set aside it appears that a like judgment would not follow;
that on the contrary it is reasonably certain that a judgment
more favorable to this plaintiff would result." Such a showing is all that is required of plaintiff in order to secure
eq~itable intervention and an opportunity for a full heari~g
on the merits. To require in thic:; suit complete proof ill
establishment of her defenses would render idle the act of
conducting a trial on the merits inthe municipal court action.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The present action is an independent suit in equity commenced after the expiration of the time for rclief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Title Ins. &7 Trust
Co. v. King etc. Co., 162 Cal. 44 [120 P. 1066] ; Hunt, Mirk
&7 Co., Inc. v. Hesperides Mining Co., 200 Cal. 382 [253 P.
317] . Knox v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.App. 452, 454 [~80
P. 375].) The remedy afforded by section 473 is akin to the
common law power of courts to vacate their own judgments
during the term they were rendered. (Olivera v. Grace, 19
Oal.2d 570, 574 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328].) For the
mORt part the cases cited by plaintiff granting relief for the
loss or delay of a pleading in the mails arose under statutes
different from those existing in this state and involved requests for such relief made in the same action shortly after
the entry of the default. (Chicago ctc. Co. v. Eastham., 26
Okla. 605 [110 P. 887 i 30 L.R.A.N.S. 740] i Boyd v. Williams,
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70 N.J.L. 185 [56 A. 135] i Norman v. Iowa Central Ry. Co.,
149 Iowa 246 [128 N.W. 349] ; Corning v. Tripp, (N.Y.) 1
How.Pr. 14; Locb v. Schmith, 1 Mont. 87; Williams v. Richmond etc. Co., 110 N.C. 466 [15 S.E. 97].) It is not enough
now 'for plaintiff to show that the judgment was taken against
her through a "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect," that would have entitled her to relief under the I>rovisions of section 473 had she made timely application therefor. (Olivera v. Grace, supra.) She must prove that bee:ause
of extrinsic fra.ud or mistake she had no reasonable oppor~
tunity to present her defense (Olivera v. Grace, supra; West~
phalv. Westphal, 20 Ca1.2d 393, 397 [126 P.2d 105}'iNeblett
v. Pacific Mutual L. Ins. Co., ante, pp. 393, 397-398 [139,P.21l
934] i Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645, 649 [134 P.2d 265] ;
Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [89 P. 317] ; see Restatement,
Judgments, secs. 118-126), and that she has not been neg1i~
gent in failing to discover the fraud or mistake. (Wattson
v. Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220]; Wilson v. Wilson, 55
Cal.App.2d 421, 427 [130 P.2d 782], and cases there cited.)
The plaintiff has not shown that defendants are guilty. of
fraud. The trial court's finding that defendants, with intent
to lull plaintiff into a false sense of security, wilfully refrained from undertaking any proceedings in the action until
more than six months after the entry of default, is not a
finding of fraud, for defendants owed plaintiff no duty to
notify her of the entry or to inform her of her legal rights.
(Code of Civ. Proc., secs. 585, 1010, 1014; Bley v. Dessin, 31
Cal.App.2d 338, 343 [87 P.2d 889] ; Trustees o/Amherst Col.
lege v. Allen, 165 Mass. 178 [42 N.E. 570].) Defendants di~
nothing to deceive plaintiff, nor were they in any way responsible for the loss of plaintiff's answer or for her belief that it
had been filed. (See Wattson v. Dillon, 6 Ca1.2d33, 42-43
[56 P.2d 220].) They had a clear legal right to delay the
entry and enforcement of the judgment and their motive in
doing so is immaterial. Plaintiff herself rejects fraud as the
basis of her action by characterizing the action in her brief
on appeal as one "to set aside a default judgment obtaine~
. . . as a result of mistake and accident."
The mistake in the present case was the erroneous belief of
plaintiff and her attorney in the earlier action that her answer
was on file, prompted by the failure of the attorney to file an
answer with the clerk of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc. sec.
465.) One who is remiss in presenting his case to ~he court,
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however, is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of setting
aside a final judgment. (Wattson v. Dillon, sttpra; Wilson v.
Wilson, supra; Borland v. Thornton, 12 Cal. 440; Quinn v.
Wetherbee, 41 Cal. 242"; Restatement, JUdgments, sees. 1,
126.) Admittedly the answer was never delivered to the
clerk, but plaintiff contends that it was mailed and that she
was not responsible for its accidental loss. Mailing, however,
is not equivalent to filing. (McDonald v. Lee, 132 Cal. 252
[64 P. 250]; Estes v. Chimes, 40 Cal.App.2d 41 [104 P.2d
74] ; see United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 [36 S.Ct.
508, 60 L.Ed. 897]; Poynor v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 81 F.2d 521, 522.) "Filing a paper consists in presenting it at the proper office, and leaving it there, deposited
with the papers in such office. . . . A paper in' a case is said
to be filed when it is delivered to the clerk and received by
him, to be kept with the papers in the cause." (Tregambo v. Comanche M.' & M. Co., 57 Cal. 501, 506; see
Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises, 49 Cal.App.2d 383, 395
[121 P.2d 829].) It is the duty of a litigant to see that his
pleading is in fact deposited in the clerk's office within the
time contemplated by law. (Tregambo v. Comanche M. & M.
Co., supra; Boyd v. Desmond, 79 Cal. 250, 253 [21 P. 755] ;
Hoyt v. Stark, 134 Cal. 178, 180·181 [66 P. 223, 86 Am.St.
Rep. 246]; Fletcher v. Maginnis, 136 Cal. 362, 363 [68 P.
1015] ; W. J. White Co. v. Winton, 41 Cal.App. 693, 695 [183
P. 277].) When he engages an attorney, the latter becomes
his agent in prosecuting' the suit and must on his behalf
perform the duties that the law imposes upon a litigant, and
the attorney's failure to do so is chargeable to his client.
(Wilson v. Wilson, supra; United States v. Duesdiekcr, 118
Cal.App. 723 ,[5P. 2d 916] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal. App.
400 [277 P. 163] ; see 14 Cal.Jur. 1042-1043; 34 C.J. 307-309;
1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), p. 495.) Thus if an
attorney fails to file an answer (Borland v. Thornton, supra) ,
or fails to find and correct an error in ,the record on appeal
(Quinn v. Wetherbee, s1J,pra) , equity will deny the client's
application to set aside the judgment. Cases such as Brackett
v. Banegas, 116 Cal. 278 [48 P. 90, 58 Am.St.Rep. 164], and
Winn v. Torr, 27 Cal.App. 2d, 623 [81 P.2d 457], were not
suits in equity to set aside a final judgment but actions to
foreclose a mortgage, and rest upon the principle that since
a mortgagee is entitled to an effectual foreclosure he is not
precluded from bringing a new action to foreclose his lien
by an earlier suit that failed of that purpose.
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Cases in which the court or its attachl'S (Sullivan v. Lumsde"" 118 Cal. 664, 668-669 [50 P. 777]; Herd v, Tuohy, 133
Cal. 55, 62-63 [65P. 139]), or the other party (Olivera v.
Grace, supra; Boyle v. BO"Jle, 97 Cal.App. 703 [276 P. 118] ;
Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [89 P. 317]; Soule v. Bacon,
150 Cal. 495 [89 P. 324] ; Bidleman v. Kewen, 2 Cal. 248;
Bibend v. Kreutz, 20 Cal. 109; Antonsen v. Pacific Container
Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535, 538-539 [120 P.2d 148]) isrcsponsible for the mistake are of no avail to plaintiff, for the
mistake was solely that of plaintiff and her counsel. Equity
will in certain cases relieve 11 complainant from, an adverse
judgment resulting from his own, mistake (see Jeffords v.
Young, supra), but it will not relieve him if he fails to
present his case with the, diligence required, of a litignnt.
(Wilson v. Wilson, supra; Borland v. Thornton, supra; Wattson v. Dillon, supraj Quinn v. Wetherbee, supra.) Defendant
assumed the risk that her answer might not reach the elerk
of the court when it was sent' to him by mail. As time p~:scd
there was no acknowledgment of the copy sent to, opposing
connsel, or any other sign to indicate that either the answer
or the copy had been received, but nothing was done to
ascertain whether the answer had in fact been delivered to
the clerk. After six months had elapsed following the entry
of default, plaintiff's attorney had still made no inquiry as
'to the progress of the case or as to whether the answer had
been filed, nor did he examine the records of the case on file
in the office of the clerk. The attorney's office was only a
few blocks from the courthouse and he could readily have
checked the records in the clerk's office. Even a telephone
inquiry would have disclosed the ~rue' status of thecas~.
Plaintiff' must be charged with his failure to ascertlim
whether the answer had been filed. (Wattson .v.D'/.'ZZon;.supNJ,;
Rudy v. SZotwinsky, 73 Cal.App. 459 [238 P,: :783].) .. '... In my opinion the trial court erred insetting aside the
judgment of the municipal court, and also erred in granting
plaintiff judgment for the sums collected by the defendants.
The judgment should therefore be reversed.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied Ailgust 19,
1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor,J., voted. for.
a rehearing.

